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T he European Resistance Movementprovides us with one of the more
engaging and captivating stories of the
Second World War, and the Polish Resis-
tance Movement has a central place in that
story. Yet, the history and the struggles of
the Polish Resistance are not well known.
Few people are aware, therefore, of the
Polish Underground's reports about the
German extermination of Jews and about
German preparations for the invasion of
the Soviet Union; the penetration of the
German rocket center at Peenemunde by
Polish agents, or the fact that Poles deliv-
ered into Allied hands the plans and actual
parts of German V-2 rocket engines. Even
many professional historians remain unfam-
iliar with such facts. No study of European
resistance during the Second World War
which does not include the resistance in
Poland can be considered complete. As
Colonel Harold B. Perkins of the British
SOE pointed out, the Resistance in Poland
was" ... the largest and best organization in
Europe" (Nowak, CourieT From Warsaw, p.
236). But at the time few people knew
much about it.
After their defeat by the German Army,
and the subsequent occupation of Poland
by the might of the German Reich and that
of the Soviet Union, the Poles responded in
a most natural way. The whole of the Polish
society went underground, and within this
clandestine realm they created a Secret
State which took control of the resistance
against the occupying powers.
The genesis of this Resistance followed
the usual patterns of spontaneity and
command. In a society whose state institu-
tions are destroyed by a violent act of war
and occupation, any resistance must initial-
ly be a spontaneous one. Under such
circumstances, groups of individuals tied
by some previous common bonds -- be they
prewar membership in social, fraternal, or
political organizations, or more recent war-
time experiences -- such aggregates of indivi-
duals formed clandestine groups which
shaped their own goals and activities. It is
here within the nature and the dynamics of
these early secret organizations that we find
the source of the variety and complexity of
both the resistance organizations and their
clandestine activities. In Poland this spon-
taneous aspect of resistance in its scope and
intensity soon reached the level of a revolu-
tionary mass movement that was unique to
Poland. Hence, writers and artists organ-
ized to carryon literary and artistic activi-
ties forbidden by the occupying authori-
ties. Actors performed forbidden plays and
musicians played forbidden music in pri-
vate and in public concerts. Writers pro-
duced hundreds of books which were pub-
lished, printed, and distributed by the
underground. Journalists too published in
the underground press, and during the
years 1939-1945 there were more than
2,000 underground papers and periodicals
published in German occupied Poland;
some of them were published continuously
through the war in large editions. Polish
educators ran a whole system of secret
secondary schools based on a prewar curric-
ulum which the Germans considered too
elitist for a "sub-human" species such as
the Poles. In Warsaw alone there were two
secret universities and one polytechnic insti-
tute continuing their educational functions
under the German noses.
Since the majority of the officers of the
prewar Polish Army were either in German
and Russian prisons or abroad, there was a
shortage of trained military personnel, and
the underground had to train most of its
own cadres. Consequently, all through the
war there were numerous officers' candi-
date schools, non-commissioned officers'
schools, and other military schools training
the military cadre for the clandestine army.
Even the scouts got involved, and from the
very beginning performed "little sabotage,"
which included such activities as writing
anti-German slogans on walls and destroy-
ing German property. Individually these
activities may have seemed unimportant,
but in their totality they had a positive
impact upon the Poles and made the Ger-
mans feel unwelcomed and insecure.
Political parties of all persuasions also
went underground. They published their
own presses and journals and formed their
own military detachments. By the end of
1939, at the very beginning of the German
and Soviet occupation, there were approxi-
mately 140 such secret groups and organiza-
tions. This spontaneous process continued
throughout the war, and as one group was
liquidated another took its place. We must
remember that all of this occurred under
the most difficult and strenuous conditions
of clandestine operations, and under the
watchful eyes of a cruel occupier who had
at his disposal the mobilized machine of a
totalitarian state. All of these activities
were, of course, Verboten and punishable by
a trip to a concentration camp -- or death.
The growth and the diversification of
such spontaneous activities and organiza-
tions made unification an important early
objective of the movement. This unifica-
tion was to be achieved by the command
aspect of the resistance, which brought
order into the chaos of spontaneity by
providing the movement with the struc-
tural means for the unification of its ac-
tions, organization, and plans. What we are
witnessing here is a healthy reaction of a
society in a state of war responding to the
conditions of foreign occupation that
called for a total mobilization and total
resistance. Interestingly, many historians of
the Resistance Movement seem to have
missed this point and the obvious fact that
the major objective of the Resistance was to
resist, and to resist by all the means at its
disposal. Thus in Poland, resistance in-
cluded the whole of society which reacted
spontaneously in a variety of ways to a
common danger. It was a society which was
directed by a set of common values and
rules strongly entrenched by a long tradi-
tion of national resistance. These tradition-
al values and rules were in turn reinforced
by the underground courts and the legiti-
mate structures of the Underground State.
In the Polish case, the source for the
legitimacy of the Underground State was
the fact that both the Resistance and the
Polish Government abroad were recog-
nized by the majority of the Poles as the
bona fide legal extension of the prewar
Polish State. Because there was no question
of legitimacy, the differing political orienta-
tions of most resistance groups did not
hinder the process of unification. Conse-
quently, by 1944 the resistance movement
in Poland was successful in unifying most
of its military units under a single com-
mand and in consolidating most of its
political activities under the central authori-
ty of the Secret State.
Politically, the process of unification and
centralization had begun in February of
1940 with the formation of a Political
Coordinating Committee (Polityczny Komi-
tet Porozumiewawczy, PKP). By 1944 the
PKP had unified most of the political
groups, with the exception of the Commu-
nists and a small radical faction of the
National Democrats who refused to join
the unified resistance organization. Thus,
the formation of the PKP in 1940 was the
real beginning of the Polish Underground
State. It was headed by a Delegate, who by
1944 held the rank of a Deputy-Premier
within the Polish Government of National
Unity in London. The first of the Delegates
was the prewar Speaker of the Polish
Parliament, Cyryl Ratajski; and the last
Delegate, after Stanislaw Jankowski, was
Stephan Korbonski, who today resides in
Washington, D.C.
It must be understood, however, that
under clandestine conditions, this process
of unification and centralization was a
gradual one. But in the end, in Poland the
resistance movement became the most uni-
fied and tht> most centralized in Europe. It
was the only resistance organization with all
the comprehensive infrastructure ofa legiti-
mate state, ranging from civic and civil
institutions on both the central and local
levels, to a well organized military struc-
ture.
By the end of the September Campaign,
just before the Polish Government left the
Polish territory during the days of Septem-
ber 17-18 of 1939, Marshal Eduard Rydz-
Smigly, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Polish Army, appointed General Michael
Tokarzewski to organize the underground
resistance in both parts ofoccupied Poland.
Colonel Stefan Rowecki became his Chief-
of-Staff. Later, Rowecki was to be the first
commander of the unified underground
army, which by 1942 was known as the
Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK).
The first of the underground military
units formed was named the Service for the
Victory of Poland (Stuzba Zwyciestwu
Potsce, SZP). But it was Tokarzewski's Un-
ion for Armed Struggle (Zwiazek Watki
Zbrojnej, ZWZ), organized in November of
1939, which became the vehicle for the
unification and centralization of the under-
ground detachments. And in February of
1942, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, the
Prime Minister of the Polish Government
in London, and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Polish Army abroad, renamed the
ZWZ the Home Army (Armia Krajowa,
AK). By that time the ZWZ had about
100,000 men, who by 1943 were joined by
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40,000 men of the Peasant Battalions (Ba
tationy Chtopskie, B.Ch.) of the Polish
Peasant Party (Potskie Stronnictwo Ludowe
PSL). Another 40,000 troops of the Peas-
ant Battalions joined the Home Army in
the spring of 1944. Simultaneousiy the
majority of the 70,000 nationalist troops of
the National Democratic Party also joined
the Home Army. But some detachments
belonging to the Radical Faction of the
Nationalist Party would not place them-
selves under the unified command of the
Home Army. The Polish Workers' Party
(Potska Partia Robotnicza, PPR -- the war-
time name of the Polish Communist Party,
which earlier in 1938 was dissolved by the
Comintern) with its Peoples' Army (Armia
Ludowa, AL) also stayed outside the Secret
State. In addition, the detachments of the
Polish Peoples' Army (Potska Armia Lu-
dowa, PAL), which was under the control
of a radical left-wing socialist faction, also
refused to unite with the rest of the Resis-
tance. Although the Communists and the
Radical Socialists were neither politically
nor militarily powerful, they were sup-
ported by the Soviet Union. The Polish
Socialist Party (Potska Partia Sociatistyczna,
PPS) and their military units, however,
were an integral part of the centralized
Resistance.
By the spring of 1944 the Home Army
(AK) had about 350,000 men who for a
clandestine army were not badly trained.
But they were poorly armed. The Poles had
access only to arms they were able to hide
after the 1939 campaign and those cap-
tured from the Germans. The British
dropped some supplies through the war,
but they were helpful only in small sabotage
activities and were inadequate for arming
such a large number of men. It seems that
the military potential of the Polish Home
Army was never understood by the Allies.
In fact, in early 1944 at a meeting in
Washington held between the American
authorities and the then Prime Minister of
the Polish Government in London, Stani-
slaw Mikolajczyk, and the Chief of Opera-
tions of the Home Army, General Stani-
slaw Tatar, a final and irrevocable decision
was made not to include the Polish Home
Army in Allied Operational Plans. By that
time the die was cast. Earlier, as a result of
the Teheran Conference of 1943, it was
decided that Poland and Eastern Europe
were to be left in the Soviet sphere of
influence. Thus, at the 1944 meeting in
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Washington the Americans were quite ada-
mant about not giving in to the Polish
demands for large scale military assistance
for the Home Army. Once more, as in
1939, the Poles were abandoned by their
allies and left to face formidable obstacles
alone. And there was no hope for help from
the Soviet Union either. By then the Sovi-
ets had broken relations with the Polish
Government over the issue of the missing
10,000 Polish officers who earlier in 1940
had been murdered by NKVD (the Soviet
Secret Police) in the Katyn Forest Massa-
cre. Furthermore, the Russians viewed the
non-communist Polish Underground as
their political and class enemy. And when
in 1944 the Red Army entered the former
Polish territories, which the Soviet consi-
dered as their own since the Soviet-German
Agreement of 1939, the Russians refused
to cooperate with the Home Army and
treated it as an enemy. Some members of
the Home Army were executed, some
forced to join Polish units under the Soviet
command, and some were sent to Siberia.
Yet, all that the Poles wanted was to be left
alone as masters of their own home, free to
govern themselves, and free to determine
their own destiny.
During the war the main military objec-
tive of the Polish Home Army was to
prepare itself for a general uprising at the
final stages of the war, to be carried out
behind the German lines in support of
Allied and Soviet operations. Through the
war all plans and training of the Home
Army were directed toward this general
uprising, known by its cryptonym Burza
(Tempest).
The interim military objectives were de-
voted to self-defense, sabotage, and intelli-
gence work. The self-defense operations of
the Underground were responsible for the
liquidation of about 6,000 German func-
tionaries. The intelligence work of the
Polish Underground was extensive and
reached beyond the borders of Poland; and
its contributions to the war efforts were
not small, but are not well known.
The sabotage was carried out under the
Directorate for Sabotage (Kierownietwo
Dywersji, KeDyw), which up to June 1944
alone was responsible for the destruction of
1167 railroad petroleum cars, 6930 rail-
road engines, 19,058 railroad cars, 4326
cars and trucks, 600 telephone and electric
lines, and the blowing up of 443 trains and
732 transports. These figures do not in-
clude the damage inflicted upon the Ger-
man forces by the Partisan Units, the
Tempest Operation, and the Warsaw Upris-
ing. The sabotage actions cost the resistance
forces 62,000 men killed; civilian losses are
not included.
The best known and most dramatic
episode of the Polish resistance was the
Warsaw Uprising of 1944. It was aimed at
the liberation of the Polish capital so that
the Poles could act in their own country as
hosts to the advancing Soviet armies. The
Russians and their communist allies, who
initially called for such an uprising, were to
condemn it as an adventurous act hostile to
the Soviet Union. Marshal Stalin for exam-
pie wrote to President Roosevelt denounc-
ing the Polish insurgents as a "group of
criminals who have embarked on the War-
saw adventure in order to seize power. .. "
(Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 130).
The uprising was designed to last three
days until the Red Army, already at the
Warsaw suburbs, would enter the city.
Instead the fighting lasted for sixty-three
days, from August 1st to October 3rd. At
Stalin's order the Red Army stopped its
advance, and Warsaw and its people were
sacrificed to the Germans. The halting of
the Soviet Army was not based on military
grounds, as is still claimed by Soviet his-
torians. Rather it was basically a political
decision aimed at the destruction of the
Polish Underground. Even later when the
Red Army finally reached the other side of
the Vistula River and gained control of the
eastern suburbs of Warsaw, the Russians
extended only sporadic help which merely
prolonged the agony, and did not insure
victory. Earlier, the Western Allies had
reluctantly flown-in limited supplies in
planes manned by Polish pilots and Allied
volunteers, most of them from South Af-
rica and New Zealand; but their losses were
extremely high. On September 18 the Rus-
sians finally permitted the USAAF to fly a
large sortie, flown by the planes from the
390th Bomb Group. Most of the needed
supplies landed on German positions.
As a result of the sixty-three days of
fighting Warsaw was destroyed, and what
remained was burned and blown up by the
Germans on a direct order of Adolph
Hitler. In the end the Warsaw Insurgents
lost over 20,000 men killed and wounded;
16,000 of the soldiers became POWs,
including the staff of the Home Army and
its commander, General T. Bor-Komorow-
ski. About 5,000 of the troops escaped.
The losses among the civilian population of
the city were equally high. Over 250,000
civilians were dead. Fifty thousand were
killed in mass executions, and sixty thou-
sand were sent to German concentration
camps. Half a million were shipped to labor
camps in Germany, and another half mil-
lion were left homeless and were dispersed.
The Germans lost 310 tanks and armored
vehicles, 340 trucks and cars, 22 artillery
pieces, three planes, and over 30,000 men
killed.
The rest of the Home Army outside of
Warsaw continued to fight under the plans
of Operation Tempest, but by then they
knew that their cause was lost. Now, they
fought only for posterity. By February of
1945, after the Russians had overrun most
of Poland, the Underground Army was
officiaHy dissolved, but many continued to
fight. Many of the Home Army troops were
disarmed by the Russians and shipped to
Siberia. And in March of 1945 the leaders
of the Polish Secret State were arrested and
taken to Moscow, where in June of 1945
they were put on trial before a Soviet court
and condemned to Russian prisons. Back at
home former members of the Under-
ground -- over a million of them -- were
shipped to Soviet concentration camps of
the infamous Gulag Archipelago. Most of
them never returned home.
The Second World War cost the Poles a
great deal in human and material sacrifices.
Most of the country was destroyed, and as a
result of the German and Soviet policies of
extermination the Polish losses were enor-
mous. Over twenty percent of the popula-
tion was killed. Two and a half million
Polish Jews alone were killed by the Ger-
mans in the ovens of Auschwitz and other
places ofexecution. It must be remembered
that Poland became the most decimated
country in Europe, and these losses were
inflicted upon Poland by both the Germans
and the Russians.
After the war the Russians and their
ideological foHowers attempted to deny the
very existence of a viable Resistance in
Poland. For the last forty years they have
tried to denigrate the memories of the
Polish Underground State, and to defame
the wartime sacrifices of the Polish people.
They claim now that the country without a
Quisling was a country of Quislings; that
the Poles, who fought the Germans with
such a fanatic persistence, fought them the
least. This kind of propaganda was not well
received by the Polish people, and in fact it
had a reverse effect. The Poles took it as an
insult and as a denial of their wartime
sacrifices, freely placed upon the collective
altar of human freedom. Today in Poland
the interest in the heroic deeds of the
wartime Resistance is greater than ever
before.
However, forty years of propaganda can
leave its marks, and we can even see it in
such supposedly scholarly works as those
of the young sociologist Jan Gross, and in
the vitriolic anti-Polish work of amateurish
historians like Shmuel Krakowski. Further-











book in the American Historical Review,
and the ensuing correspondence, reveals
how little American historians seem to
know about the matter. Of course, Ameri-
can unfamiliarity with everything Polish or
East European is well known by now, and it
is best represented by the "joy-fool" accep-
tance of the wartime German propaganda
about the Polish cavalry charging German
tanks. This story, by the way, is still being
repeated in the American press and in
American schoolrooms today! The answer
to the question why such stories are so
easily accepted by some might provide us
with food for thought, and might also
provide us with some insights into the
American psyche. After all, attitudes like
this seem to have a long and continuous
history in America. And after the war -- just
as before -- Poland and the Poles were
seldom presented in a positive light, be it in
American press, literature, or films. The
Poles were usually presented -- if not as
outright stupid -- at least as dull, slovenly,
and untrustworthy. Such negative stereo-
types serve to dehumanize people. That is
how the Nazis arrived at their ideas of
subhuman races. Once these racist teach-
ings were accepted it was easier for Ger-
mans to accept as morally acceptable all
atrocities against such "subhuman" groups
as the Jews and the Poles.
Stereotypes like these were also common
during the war, even in some surprising
quarters. During the war leading western
politicians loved to refer to Poland as the
"Inspiration of Nations" and as "a country
without a Quisling." However, their true
feelings were quite different. President
Roosevelt, for example, never was an ad-
mirer of the Poles. This is best illustrated by
his reference to Poland as a country which
was "a source of trouble for over five
hundred years... " (Churchill, Triumph and
Tragedy, p. 372). And Winston Churchill
had similar views of Poland as a country
which was "Glorious in revolt and ruin;
squalid and shameful in triumph. The
bravest of the brave, too often led by the
vilest of the vile! And yet there were always
two Polands; one struggling to proclaim the
truth and the ether grovelling in villainy"
(Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 323).
Now, if this was true of Poland, would not
such a description fit everybody else?
No wonder that with such attitudes at
Teheran and Yalta both Roosevelt and
Churchill so easily condemned Poland and
the whole of Eastern Europe to a new
tyranny and slavery. But were their actions
right, and were they just? These are the
questions that have puzzled many ever
since. And on that subject General Bor-
Komorowski was to write after the war:
"To conduct world peace at the expense of
injustice and wrong done to small nations is
a dangerous experiment. It can only result
in acute political tensions and a perpetual
smouldering of grievances -- a most precar-
ious state of international affairs, so clearly
demonstrated by our present times"
(Komorowski, The Secret Army, p. 396).
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